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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
V. Case Number: 20140148-CA 
JANIES C. ?v1CCALLIE 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION 
Appeal from a conviction for aggravated assault, a third degree felony in 
the Third District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable, Denise P. Lindberg, 
Judge, presiding. 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103(2)(e). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. \tVhether the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant Mr. 
JVIcCallie's motion for mistrial and motion for new trial when the 
prosecutor argued that the jury could infer guilt from l\!Ir. McCallie's right 
to silence. 
a. Standard of Review: "When reviewing a [ district] court's denial of a 
motion for a new trial, we will not reverse absent a clear abuse of 
discretion by the [ district] court." State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, ~ 12, 
994 P.2d 1 77 (internal quotations omitted). "At the same time, 
1 
however, we review the legal standards applied by the [ district] court 
in denying the motion for correctness." State v. Nlartin, 2002 UT 34, 1 
45, 44 P.3d 805. 
b. Preservation of the Argument: Mr. McCallie made a motion for 
mistrial and renewed his objection in a motion for new trial. R. 223-
25; 298 : 121. 
2. vVhether the trial court erroneously denied Mr. l\ticCallie's motion for a 
directed verdict given that the State's entire case hinged on the testimony of 
a person whose blood alcohol limit effectively prevented him from 
accurately remembering events. 
a. Standard of Review: "This court's standard of review of a directed 
verdict is the same as that imposed upon a trial court," in that the 
motion will only be granted if there is "no competent evidence that 
would support a verdict in the non-moving party's favor." Nlerino v. 
Albertsons) Inc., 1999 UT 14, 1 3, 975 P.2d 467 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
b. Preservation of the Argument: Mr. McCallie made a motion for a 
directed verdict on this basis. R. 298:28. 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The texts of the relevant Constitutional provisions and statutes are 111 
Addendum A and B. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 5, 2013, a warrant issued for i\!Ir. McCaUie. R. 3-4. The State 
filed an amended information l\1ay 1, 20 13. R. 19-21. The case was tried to a jury 
October 2 and 3, 2013 who acquitted l\!lr. iVIcCallie on the major charge, 
discharge of a firearm, but convicted him of aggravated assault, a third degTee 
felony. R. 138-39; 297-98. l\!Ir . iVIcCallie was sentenced December 16, 2013 and 
the judgment entered that same day. R . 214-15. Mr. l\!IcCaUie filed a motion for 
new trialjanuary 3, 20 14 and the court denied that motion February 11, 2014. R. 
223-25; 262-63 . Mr. McCallie filed a notice of appeal to this court the next day, 
February 12, 2014. R. 264-65. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This case involves an evening among individuals playing cribbage and 
poker as well as heavy drinking. According to the State's version of events, Mr. 
iVIcCallie insulted John Pearce 's aunt, and while highly intoxicated, pulled a gun 
on Pearce in the hallway. The gun discharged in an ensuing struggle, hitting 
Pearce. Mr. McCallie insisted that Pearce, who had been drinking for ten hours 
and had a blood alcohol level of .3 1, attacked him in his bedroom and that, while 
McCallie pulled the gun in self-defense, Pearce tripped the trigger while they were 
struggling over the gun on the bed. 
The jury ultimately acquitted l\1r. McCaUie of discharging the weapon, but 
found that he committed an aggravated assault for brandishing the gun. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Nir. NicCallie refused to answer questions when he was arrested and taken 
to the police station . The State took great pains to avoid using Mr. McCallie's 
silence against him during the trial, as it openly acknowledged a few times in the 
trial. However, during closing argument, the State argued that Nir. NicCallie failed 
to tell his story to the police when he was questioned and that this failure was an 
indication of his guilt. This violated Nir. McCallie's constitutional right to remain 
silent because the State used his silence to infer a motive to fabricate his story. 
Additionally, the State's entire case hinged on the testimony of one person, 
J ohn Pearce . Pearce 's blood alcohol level turned out to be .31, four times the legal 
limit and one in which the scientific literature deems a person almost completely 
incapable of remembering what occurred. In other words, no rational trial finder 
could believe Pearce's story. Pearce could not concretely remember virtually any 
detail of the crime and made several statements soon after indicating that he could 
not remember what had transpired. Additionally, Pearce's story was flatly 
contradicted by the evidence from the scene. No bullet hole matched his story, and 
the only apparent bullet hole in the room was behind and above where Pearce said 





The trial court abused its discretion in 
denying Mr. McCallie's motion for mistrial 
and motion for new trial, given the State's 
comments regarding Mr. McCallie's exercise 
of his right to remain silent 
Prior to trial, Mr. NicCallie made a motion in limine to prevent the State 
from referencing a police interview where Nir. NlcCallie refused to answer 
questions and where he told police he did not understand the 1\lliranda warnings. R. 
-
297: I. The prosecutor responded, "I spoke to my detective about that very point. 
As we went over the interview I said, Look, you don't want to go anywhere near, 
that can be cast as us commenting on his right to remain silent." R. 297: 1. The 
State continued, saying that it wanted to question the officer about Mr. McCallie's 
behavior- that he "was uncooperative, combative" and "smartalecky" with the 
police. R. 297:2 . The State said, 
I would like to have the Detective [Arnn] testify as to his behavior 
but we 're not going to go into the content and I told him specifically 
and I'll reiterate to him, we do not want to go around Nliranda, I'm 
not going to ask that. All I want to ask you about is how was he 
behaving. 
R. 297:2. The court admonished the State that "behavioral descriptions of what he 
observed ... should be acceptable. " R. 297:2 . 
\!\Then Detective Arnn testified, the State said to him, in reference to his 
interview of Nfr. McCallie, "I'm not going in to what was said specifically but I 
want to ask you questions about the man as you saw him ... " R. 297: 130. Later, 
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the State, in asking whether Mr. McCallie could articulate himself or was 
intoxicated, said to the detective, "When you spoke with - again without going into 
the content - with the defendant did he have that same clarity?" R. 297: 131. The 
State asked no further questions regarding the intervievv with Mr. l\!IcCallie and 
only elicited the officer's opinion that in his few minutes of interaction, l\!Ir. 
McCallie appeared intoxicated. R. 29 7: 131-3 2. 
l\!Ir. l\!IcCallie testified, and as a result of that testimony, the State elicited 
some of his statements, such as he asked police for a rum and Coke and a six pack 
of beer. R . 298:64-65. Additionally, when the officer asked l\!Ir. Mc Callie about his 
Afiranda rights , Mr. McCallie responded that he didn't understand " [t]he part 
where you're fucking jerking me off ·vvhat the fuck am I doing here to begin with? 
You people woke me up." R. 298:65. 
During the State's closing argument, the State changed course, opting to 
argue that l\!Ir. McCallie 's silence entitled the jury to infer his guilt. The prosecutor 
was in the process of arguing that l\!Ir. McCallie's story evolved over time. R. 
298: 119-20. H e then made the following, objectionable, statement: 
The evolution of his story from the very beginning when [the police] 
questioned him, what does he say? vVhy am I here? \!\Thy are you 
jerking me off? Nothing happened. You woke me up. You woke me 
up. He didn 't say it was an accident. He doesn't say this was self-
defense. 
R. 298: 120. The defense objected that this was "a comment on my client's right to 
remain silent" and moved for mistrial. R. 298: 121. The trial court summarily 
denied the motion. R. 298: 121. 
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After trial, Mr. :tvfcCallie filed a motion for new trial based on the improper 
comment. R. 223-25 . The motion mentioned that Mr. McCallie "refused to 
answer the questions of the police when he was arrested" and that "refusal was 
tantamount to invoking his right to remain silent under the constitutions of Utah 
and the United States." R. 223. NicCallie argued that "[i]n order to ... sway the 
jury into believing that the Defendant was fabricating a defense, [the prosecutor] 
stated that the Defendant did not tell the police when he was arrested that he had 
acted in self-protection or that the shooting was an accident." R. 223-24. Nfr. 
McCallie also alleged that the court failed to issue a curative instruction. R. 224. 
McCallie alleged that the error was particularly harmful given serious 
inconsistencies in the victim's testimony. R. 224; see point II, ir!fi·a. Because the 
jury's only determination involved the credibility of two people, and where the 
physical evidence did not comport with the victim's story but with McCallie's 
story, " the prosecutor had to impugn the Defendant and his testimony in order to 
convince the jury of guilt. He did that by stating that if his testimony and defenses 
were worthy of belief that he would have told the police when he was arrested." R. 
224. Without a corrective instruction, this left the jury with the impression that this 
was proper basis to infer guilt. R . 224. 
The State admitted that it "argued that Defendant was gwen an 
opportunity to tell the police what had occurred on the night in question and 
instead of saying it was an accident or that it was in self-defense, as he claimed at 
trial, Defendant was confused why police were even there and told them 'nothing 
7 
happened."' R. 252. It also asserted that l\!Ir. McCallie had not "invoke[d] his 
right to remain silent at this point." R. 252. The State then argued that Mr. 
McCallie's statement to the police that "nothing happened," coupled with later 
statements (that it was an accident and that it was self-defense) amounted to 
"proper argument" to show that l\!Ir. lVIcCallie was "not credible and his claim of 
self-defense should not be believed." R . 253. 
The court denied the motion, stating that the comment was "an 
appropriate comment" on l\!Ir. lVIcCallie's credibility "given inconsistencies in 
defendant's prior statements to the police and others." R. 262. Additionally, the 
court found that Mr. lVIcCallie's refusal to talk to the police did not amount to an 
invocation of the right to remain silent, since it believed the right must be invoked 
unequivocally. R. 262. 
The trial court erred in allowing the State to use Mr. lVIcCallie's silence as a 
basis to infer his guilt. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
says, "No person shall be ... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself. ... " U .S. Const. amend. V. This right "can be claimed in any proceeding, 
be it criminal or civil, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory .. .. 
[I] t protects any disclosures which the witness may reasonably apprehend could be 
used in a criminal prosecution or which could lead to other evidence that might be 
so used." State v. Gallup, 2011 UT App 422', ~ 14, 267 P.3d 289 (quoting State v. 
Palmer, 860 P.2d 339, 34 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)). 
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The State's use of Mr. NicCallie's silence as evidence of his guilt violates his 
right against self-incrimination and was a critical error requiring reversal. "The 
general rule of law is that once a defendant invokes his right to remain silent, it is 
impermissible for the prosecution to refer to any Fifth Amendment rights which 
defendant exercised." United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 11 96, 1201 (10th Cir. 1991 ). 
As the Supreme Court has held, "the Fifth Amendment . . . forbids either comment 
by the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the court that such 
silence is evidence of guilt." Griffinu. California, 380 U .S. 609,6 15, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 
1233, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965). 
The State's comment that Mr. McCallie's silence indicated some sort of 
guilt was clearly improper. See State v. Easter) 130 v\Tash . 2d 228, 235, 922 P.2d 
1285, 1289 (1996) ("the State may not elicit comments from witnesses or make 
closing arguments relating to a defendant's silence to infer guilt from such 
silence"). As the Supreme Court has held, "the use for impeachment purposes of 
petitioners' silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, 
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. " Doyle v. Ohio, 426 
U .S. 610,6 19, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 2245, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976). 
Indeed, in Doyle, the State sought to make the exact inference that it made 
in this case, which the Court found to be improper. The State argued " that the 
discrepancy between an exculpatory story at' trial and silence at time of arrest gives 
rise to an inference that the story was fabricated somewhere along the way, 
perhaps to fit within the seams of the State's case as it was developed at pretrial 
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hearings." Id. at 616. The State did nothing different in this case. It argued that 
Mr. McCallie made up the story later, otherwise he would have shared it at the 
time of interrogation. This is clearly prohibited. 
In State v. Wiswell, the Utah Supreme Court reversed a conviction for a 
similar comment. In that case, the prosecutor argued to the jury that "I asked the 
officer who drove him to those places what the defendant said. He didn't tell the 
officer that he was an unwilling participant." State v. T1Viswell, 639 P.2d 146, 147 
(Utah 1981 ). The court reversed the conviction, noting that the "prosecutor's 
comments during his final argument" was an attempt "by the prosecutor to put the 
defendant's silence before the jury after his having been advised of his right to 
remain silent amounts to prosecutorial misconduct." Id. As this court has put it, 
A prosecutor must specifically inquire about or argue using a 
defendant's exercise of his rights in a context that would impeach a 
defendant's exculpatory explanation of his conduct. The key is the 
framing of a question or a prosecutor's comment that demands an 
explanation from the defendant and raises the inference that silence 
equals guilt. 
State v. Jvlaas, 1999 UT App 325, ,r 20, 991 P.2cl 1108, 1112. The problem is when 
"the prosecution . . . attempt[s] to cast the forbidden inference that [the 
defendant's] silence equaled guilt." Id., ,r 25. That is exactly what occurred here. 
The prosecutor took Mr. NlcCallie's silence and used it to make an inference that 
he was lying, and thus, guilty-that if his sto_ry was correct, he would have told the 
police. 
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Nor was the trial court correct in stating that a defendant must affirmatively 
invoke the right to remain silent in order to claim it. One easily invokes one's Fifth 
Amendment right when he chooses to remain silent. "[I]t is difficult to see how 
remaining silent is not an exercise of one's right to remain silent." Gallup, 2011 UT 
App 422, ~ 32 (V oros,J. , concurring);~ 15 ("the Jvfiranda warning itself is framed as 
a right to remain silent, implying that the right to be silent exists before a Jvliranda 
vvarning is necessary") (emphasis in original). In Gallup, the State argued that it 
could use a defendant's hanging up the phone as evidence against him. Id. ,~ 17. 
This court found that it put the defendant in a Catch-22, to either "speak with the 
trooper or to remain silent" and that the court prejudicially erred in admitting the 
defendant's silence against him. Id. at~~ 17-18, 25; see also Palmer, 860 P.2d 339. 
The trial court's reliance on 17zompkins was misplaced. In that case, the 
defendant remained largely silent for a few hours during an interrogation, but then 
later spoke with police. Berglzuis v. 17zompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 375-76, 130 S. Ct. 
2250, 2263, 176 L. Ed. 2d 1098 (2010). He argued to the Court that the period of 
silence amounted to an invocation of the right to remain silent for purposes of 
Jvfiranda, which would have required police to cut off the interrogation. Id. at 380-
81. The Court disagreed, saying that police are not required to end an 
interrogation if a defendant only remains silent. Id. at 381. Had the defendant said 
either that he wanted to remain silent or that he did not want to talk with the 
police, "he would have invoked his 'right to cut off questioning." ' Id. at 382. 
Certainly, in dealing w-ith the police, a defendant must unambiguously tell them 
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that he is invoking his right to silence so that they cease questioning. But if a 
defendant chooses to remain silent in the interrogation (and never speaks with the 
police), then he has, by definition, chosen to exercise the right as the police 
informed him. 
This question is opposite to J\!Ir. :McCallie's case for several reasons. In this 
case, first, Mr. J\llcCallie did not later choose to speak with the police, as the 
defendant did in 17wmpkins. He refused- he remained silent. As the Court put it, 
" [i]f Thompkins wanted to remain silent, he could have said nothing in response to {police} 
questions, or he could have unambiguously invoked his lvliranda rights and ended the 
interrogation." Thompkins, 560 U.S . at 386. Thus, the Court found that by later 
speaking, Thompkins waived his right to remain silent. Id. at 385. J\!Ir. McCallie 
did not later speak, and thus, his did not waive a right to remain silent. 
Second, Mr. J\llcCallie's Miranda violation is different. Thompkins argued 
that he invoked J\lliranda by silence and that subsequent statements to police were 
involuntarily given. J\!Ir. :McCallie invoked lvliranda by remaining silent once he was 
subject to police questioning. He never spoke to police again. Mr. J\!IcCallie's 
argument is focused to that point. He chose to remain silent when faced with 
police questioning and that the State later used that silence against him at trial. 
This is a fundamentally different question than the Court addressed in Tizompkins. 
l\!Ir. l\llcCallie was harmed for the reasons stated in his motion and for the 
reasons stated in Point II, irifi·a. The issue in this case is that the prosecutor used 
Mr. McCallie's silence as evidence of his guilt. As the Utah Supreme Court has 
12 
held, "when a person invokes his constitutional rights, the prosecution should not 
comment thereon, nor so use it in any way that will tend to impair or destroy that 
privilege." State v. Urias, 609 P.2d 1326, 1328 (Utah 1980). The problem occurs 
when something is "implied or argued regarding any inference to be drawn" from 
a defendant's silence. State v. Demartinis, 2008 UT App 261, *2 (unpublished); see 
Urias, 609 P.2cl at 1328 ("It is significant that there is no indication that the 
prosecutor made any attempt to use that fact to cast any inference of guilt of the 
defendant, nor to persuade the jury to do so"). "The prosecutor may not in his 
closing arguments, ma[k]e any further mention of [the defendant's] silence." State 
v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 4.-5, ~ 67, 979 P.2d 799, 820. 
As this court has stated, there are particular harms w-ith using post-Jvliranda 
silence against a defendant. "[T] he prosecution may not use a defendant's post-
Miranda silence as substantive evidence of guilt" because its "use of post-Jvliranda 
silence prejudices the defendant by attempting to create an inference of guilt in the 
jury's mind." State v. Byrd, 937 P.2d 532, 534- (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (internal 
citation, quotation and corrections omitted) (citing State v. Saunders, 98 Ohio 
App.3d 355, 648 N.E.2d 587, 590 (1994) (noting effect of prosecutor's comment 
was to suggest guilt of defendant, "because an innocent person would not have 
remained silent"). 
In Byrd, this court found that a ·prosecutor's cross-examination of a 
defendant improperly commented on his right to silence. Byrd, 937 P.2d at 537. In 
Byrd, the prosecutor solicited from an officer that the defendant remained silent 
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during police questioning, then asked the defendant, "You certainly did not say 
anything to [the police] about [your story], did you?" Id. at 535. This was harmful 
error, this court found . 
To determine whether the State's improper use of defendant's silence 
was harmless, we consider the follO\,ving factors: "( 1) whether the jury 
vvould 'naturally and necessarily construe' the comment as referring 
to defendant's silence; (2) whether there was overwhelming evidence 
of defendant's guilt; (3) whether the reference was isolated; and (4) 
whether the trial court instructed the jury not to draw any adverse 
presumption from defendant's [silence]." State v. R9es, 861 P.2d 
1055, 1057 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
Id. As to the first point, this court found that the questioning "clearly referred to 
defendant's failure, follovving the J\lliranda warnings, to deny involvement in the 
drug transaction" and amounted to a comment on his silence. Id. at 536. Like Byrd, 
the State's comment specifically mentioned that when questioned, Mr. McCallie 
did not tell the police his version of events. R . 298: 120. This was clearly a 
comment on his silence. 
As to the second point, the court emphasized that " [ c] ourts have generally 
refused, however, to conclude that evidence was overwhelming in cases that 
ultimately rested on the jury's resolution of conflicting evidence, particularly where 
the defendant's credibility is involved." Byrd, 937 P.2cl at 536. In Byrd, " [b]ecause 
both the State and defendant offered conflicting versions of the events surrounding 
the drug transaction and arrest, [and] th\ case came "down to a one-on-one 
situation, i.e., the word of the defendant against the word of the key prosecution 
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witness[ es]" ... we cannot say that the evidence against defendant in this case was 
overwhelming." Id. 
Similarly, the case came down to the credibility of two witnesses, one of 
whom was highly intoxicated-to the point of incapacitation-and whose 
testimony was contradicted by virtually all of the physical evidence. Indeed, the 
jury did not believe the victim's claim about the discharge of the firearm. 
However, if the jury believed that it was proper to infer guilt as to the assault from 
Mr. McCallie's decision to remain silent-to not tell the police his story-then this 
improperly tipped the scales against Nlr. NicCallie. In other words, if the jury 
believed that if Nlr. McCallie truly fired in self-defense and that the gun 
ac_cidentally discharged, but that if this story were true, he would have told the 
police initially, as the State argued, then they would have rejected his claim on an 
improper basis. 
As to the third point, the court found that even though the prosecutor made 
only two short references to the silence, given that the case lasted only two days, 
that the comments came close to the end of the case, and that the court failed to 
instruct the jury to disregard the comment, the evidence "weigh [ eel] against the 
State on this factor." Id. at 536-3 7. Similarly, in this case the comment came 
literally minutes before the jury retired to deliberate. It was almost the last thing 
said to them. Because this case also onl)' lasted two days, and because the 
comment came so close to deliberations, like Byrd, it was particularly egregious. 
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The court's failure to issue a curative instruction was also problematic. In 
one case, this court again found harm with the State's solicitation of evidence of a 
defendant's silence at trial, and noted the particular problem with not curatively 
instructing the jury. "Although the elicited comment was isolated and was not 
referred to in closing argument, the trial court did not immediately admonish the 
jury to disregard it," the court found. Reyes, 861 P. 2d at 105 7. 
As this court emphasized in Gallup, JVIr. JVIcCallie was placed in a Catch-22. 
Had Mr. JVIcCallie decided to talk to the police, then any statements he made 
could have been used against him. If he decided not to talk to the police, as is his 
right under the Constitution, then the State still could, and in fact, did, use his 
silence against him. JVIr. NicCallie should have the protection of the Constitution 
which prevents the State from using his silence adversely at trial. See Tortolito v. 
State, 901 P.2d 387, 390 CWyo. 1995) ("a citizen who stands mute in the face of 
accusatory interrogation about the crime during a law enforcement investigation 
and inquiry is without constitutional protection against law enforcement personnel 
who treat silence as probative evidence of guilt"). Thus, the court erred in failing to 
grant the motion for mistrial. 
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POINT II 
The trial court erred in failing to grant Mr. 
McCallie's motion for acquittal and directed 
verdict given the victim's highly intoxicated 
state and contradictions in the physical 
evidence 
After the State rested, the defense made a motion for directed verdict based 
on insufficiency of the evidence. R . 298:28. In particular, the defense claimed that 
the Pearce "was so under the influence that no reasonable jury could believe his 
testimony." R. 298:28. The court denied the motion, reasoning that "the State has 
made its prima facie case" and that questions as to Pearce's intoxication went to 
the weight of his testimony. R. 298:28. The State, however, failed to make out its 
prima facie case because the evidence, which depended entirely on Pearce's 
testimony, was based on a non-existent memory from extreme intoxication, and 
was so contradictory to the physical evidence, as to be utterly non-persuasive. 
A. ST AND ARDS FOR INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
"'A conviction not based on substantial reliable evidence cannot stand. "' 
State v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, 1 14, 210 P.3d 288. Further, "a defendant need not 
adduce any evidence in his defense unless the prosecution first adduces believable 
evidence of all the elements of the crime charged." State v. Smith, 675 P.2d 521, 524 
(Utah 1983). A "motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence at the conclusion of the 
State's case in chief requires the trial court to determine whether the defendant 
must proceed with ... his defense." State v . . Noren, 74 P.2d 568, 5 70 (Utah 1985) 
(citations omitted). "In order to submit a question to the jury, it is necessary that 
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the prosecution present some evidence, of every element needed to make out a 
cause of action. " Id. (citation omitted). "\tVhen it appears to the court that there is 
not sufficient evidence to put a defendant to his defense, it shall forthwith order 
him discharged." Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-3 (2008)); see Utah R. Crim. P. l 7(p). 
This court will hold that there was insufficient evidence if "after viewing the 
evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict, the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime for which he or she was convicted." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 
74,~ 18, l0P.3d 346 (quotingStatev.Dunn,850P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993)) . 
B. JOHN PEARCE'S TESTIMONY 
Pearce was the only person other than Nir. NicCallie present during the 
crime. According to Pearce, he showed up to visit his aunt and uncle, Tim and 
J ody Krogh, around 9 am, bringing a half-gallon of whiskey. R. 297 :16-17. The 
three played cribbage and drank for several hours until sometime late afternoon 
when Mr. NicCallie, who rented a bedroom in the house, showed up with a 12 or 
18 pack of beer. R. 297: 18-19, 23. l\!Ir. NicCallie sat at the table with them and 
drank some beer and whiskey and chit chatted, but did not play. R. 297 : 18- 19. 
At some moment, Mr. McCallie called Pearce's aunt a "cunt" and said it 
stood for "can't understand normal thinking." R. 297 : 19-20. They started arguing. 
T im asked Mr. McCallie to apologize and l\!Ir. lVIc'Callie refused. R. 297 :20. The 
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game finished and Tim andJody went to bed-around 8 or 9 pm. R. 297:21 . Nlr. 
McCallie and Pearce continued to play poker and drink whiskey for several hours. 
R. 297:21-22, 43. 
The two began to argue again about the earlier insult and Pearce told t\!lr. 
NicCallie that he disrespected his family. According to Pearce, Mr. NicCallie said 
to "go fuck myself' and refused to apologize . R. 297:22. Pearce's uncle Tim then 
came out of his bedroom and told the two to quiet down. R. 297:22 . By the time 
they had the argument, Pearce had been drinking "[r]oughly maybe 10 hours or 
better." R. 297:33. 
Mr. NlcCallie then told Pearce to come into his bedroom for a shot of 
brandy. As the two walked toward the bedroom, talking about golfing, Nlr. 
:NicCallie turned around, just at the foot of the bed, pointed a gun at Pearce and 
said, "How about I just fuckin' kill you?" R. 297:22-23, 35-36, 40. Pearce watched 
him pull back the hammer and point the gun at his face, about six inches away. R. 
297:24. 
Pearce testified he "grabbed his vvrist and the barrel of the gun and tried to 
pull it away from me ... " R. 297:24. During that struggle the gun came "clown 
into my side and then the gun went off" R. 297:24. The whole struggle took 
"Q]ess than a second" and the gun went off in "the blink of an eye"-it "was all 
instantaneous." R. 297:27 . Pearce said the gun burned his hand as it went off R. 
297:31. 
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The bullet went through Pearce's side through the front and out the back 
and should have been somewhere in the room. R. 297:27-29, 40. The two 
struggled and Pearce spun l\!Ir. McCallie to the bed, "put my knee on his arm" 
and screamed for help. R. 297:29. Pearce said that when the police showed up, he 
told Mr. McCallie that he would tell them it was an accident if l\!Ir. McCallie let go 
of the gun, which he did. R. 297:30. 
C. TESTIMONY OF TIM AND JODY KROGH 
Tim Krogh testified that Pearce had been there all day drinking whiskey 
and that he played cards with him for some of the day. R. 297:73-75. He heard 
l\!IcCallie insult his wife, but he stayed with them for an hour or so, while the two 
calmed down and l\!IcCallie played the guitar. R. 297:83-84. He heard l\!Ir. 
McCallie and Pearce arguing around 10 pm and that he told them to be quiet and 
that Pearce needed to not come by anymore and that l\!IcCallie would have to find 
a new place to live the next morning. R. 297:67-68. Tim went back again, but said 
the two were only being loud and boisterous, not arguing. R. 297:77-78. He heard 
the gunshot and ran to l\llcCallie's bedroom, seeing Pearce with his left knee on 
McCallie's left hand which held the gun, and Pearce's right hand on the gun's 
barrel. R. 297 :68-70, 80. Pearce's left hand held l\!Ir. McCallie's other wrist. R. 
297:69-70. Pearce said he had been shot. R. 297:70. In the ten seconds Tim saw 
the scene, he said it looked like a one-sided struggle with Pearce on top of 
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l\licCallie. R. 297 :71-72. Jody showed up and Tim pushed her back and called 
911. R. 297:71 . 
Jody Krogh testified that the men were being loud that evening and they 
woke her up. R. 297 :87-88. vVhen she confronted them about it, l\!Ir. l\licCallie 
called her names, which made Pearce upset. R. 297:88-89 . She heard Tim asking 
them to leave, and later heard the gunshot. R. 297 :90-91. She saw the two 
struggling briefly. R. 297:90. 
D. TESTIMONY OF DETECTIVE ARNN 
Detective Arnn visited Pearce in the hospital within an hour of the shooting. 
R. 297 : 107, 11 7. He took a short statement from him, which he had no difficulty 
understanding. R. 297: 110-11. Pearce did not seem to slur his words. R. 297:112. 
Arnn returned to the scene and secured the gun and ammunition. R. 297: 11 7-21. 
Arnn locked for a projectile, but could not find one. R. 297: 126-27. They 
found a "spot on the wall" in the bedroom that "was fairly high" that could have 
been a bullet hole. R. 297 : 127. "There appeared to be a hole in the drywall which 
appeared consistent with may have been caused by a projectile." R. 297:128. Arnn 
used a Saws-All to dig into the wall, but only found several two by fours and no 
projectile in the wood. R. 297 : 128, 140-41. Arnn saw an indentation on the wood 
which was "consistent enough" with a bullet hole that prompted him to dig. R. 
297: 143-44. Arnn admitted that it was "very possible" that the "bullet hit that 
wood and fell down, fell down or disintegrated or moved to some other location 
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... " but that he failed to follow through on that possibility. R . 297:146. He testified 
that the hole on the ceiling "seemed like my most likely spot for that bullet hole" 
and that having searched the entire room, they could not find any other place 
where a bullet could have been. R. 297: 14 7. Arnn marked the spot on the wall 
where the hole was, which was above the bed, where McCallie and Pearce 
struggled. R. 297: 134--35; Def. Ex. 11. H e admitted it "didn't feel that it was that 
important" to find the bullet in order to confirm Pearce's story. R. 297: 148. 
Arnn interviewed Mr. IvicCallie and smelled the odor of alcohol on him 
and believed him to be intoxicated. R. 297 :1 31-32. He did not do any sort of field 
sobriety test or ever test IvicCallie's blood. R. 297 : 139-40. But McCallie had an 
injury to his face that was bleeding. R. 297: 139, State's Ex. 6. 
E. RECORDINGS 
The State also played several j ail recordings from Ivfr. IvicCallie. In one 
recording ,,vith Tim, IvicCallie said he thought he shot Tim and that he needed 
Pearce "to say this was an accident." R. 298: 11 9. In a phone call to his mother, 
IvicCallie said that Pearce would say the shooting was an accident. R. 298: 119. 
Then in a later phone call to a Christy, Tim's daughter, IvicCallie asked her to 
"get a little pushy" with Pearce, that "it'll be well worth [Pearce's] while" if he 
cooperated and that he would "take care of him." R. 298: 11 9. In a later call, 
McCallie said that "I'm going a different direction with the story now, it's self-
defense now sinceJohn doesn't want to play ball." R. 298:119. 
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F. TESTIMONY OF JAMES MCCALLIE 
Mr. McCallie testified that he had been driving a semi-truck that day and, 
presenting his logs, showed that he arrived in Salt Lake City betvveen 8:30 and 
9:00 pm that day. R. 298:33-34. H e said he stopped off at 7-11, picked up an 18-
pack of beer and then went to the bank. R. 298:34-35 . McCallie provided a receipt 
sho-wing he pulled cash from an ATM for his rent at 10 pm. R. 298:33-35. 
He got home and found Pearce there. R . 297 :36. The two were "becoming 
friends" and so l\!IcCallie put his truck bag in his bedroom and began working on 
his logs. R . 298 :37 -38. Pearce started talking with l\llcCallie about guns for 30-45 
minutes, by ,,vhich time, McCallie had consumed two beers. R. 298:38. He got up 
to walk to his bedroom and show Pearce the gun. R. 298:38-39. He pulled the gun 
out of his dresser, set it on the bed then picked it up, unloaded it, walked out of the 
bedroom and showed it to Pearce . R. 298:38-39. He then took the gun back to the 
bedroom and began to load it when Pearce came back in. R. 298:39 . l\!Ir. 
McCallie believed Pearce wanted to steal the gun, so McCallie asked him to leave, 
then reloaded it and put it under his pillow to try to hide it from Pearce. R. 
298:39-40. 
He came back out and played guitar with Pearce, who kept asking him to 
drink whiskey. R. 298:40. J'vlcCallie put the bottle to his lips to placate Pearce, but 
did not drink, since he only drank hard , alcohol on his birthday. R. 298:40. 
l\!IcCallie then took two beers into the shower with him, drank one of them and 
had two other unopened beers on his nightstand. R. 298:41-42. He got dressed 
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and Pearce came back the bedroom asking him to come out and do more shots. R. 
298:42. 
McCallie went back out and they played music and were a "little bit loud" 
when Jody came out and was upset about being woken up. R. 298:43 . McCallie 
called her names and said he'd be moving out. R. 298:43. Pearce demanded that 
McCallie apologize, but he refused. R. 298:43-44. NicCallie went to the bedroom, 
and Pearce came in, stood on NicCallie's feet with his fists clenched, demanding 
that McCallie apologize. R. 298:45. McCallie reached behind him and grabbed 
, 
the gun with his left hand from under his pillow because he felt threatened. R . 
298:45-46. He told Pearce to leave the room. 
That's when he grabbed the gun and he pinned my finger ·against 
the frame of the gun. Well, when I pulled back on it, he fell over the 
top of me and he had his finger in the trigger guard and in essence, 
when he fell over the top of me, he pushed the trigger and fired the 
weapon himself. 
R. 298:46. Mc Callie denied ever threatening to kill Pearce. R . 298:4 7. He only to 
Pearce he wanted him "out of my room." R. 298:4 7. 1-'IcCallie said he held the 
gun's hammer back to prevent Pearce from firing or getting control of the weapon 
and using it on him. R. 298:48-49. 
McCallie testified that he put clothes on and ,went outside, where the police 
took him to the ground and crushed his face into the pavement, cutting it. R. 
298:52-53. 
In regards to the phone calls, Mr. lVIcCallie testified that he called Tim and 
pretended not to know so that he could hear his side of the story. R. 298:56. In 
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fact, Pearce told NkCallie's mother that the shooting was an accident. R. 298:58-
59. Christy told McCallie that Pearce wanted to be compensated and McCallie 
agreed that he would help take care of him. R. 298:59, 66. But when Pearce said 
he would no longer say it was an accident, McCallie had to say what happened, 
which was that the gun vvas pulled in self-defense. R. 298:60. 
G. OTHER DEFENSE WITNESSES 
Dr. Robert Rothfeder testified for the defense . He reviewed Pearce's 
medical records and found his blood alcohol level was at .31, four times the 
presumptive level and that the attending physician described him as "heavily 
intoxicated" when he arrived at the hospital. R. 298:6-7, 9. He testified that a 
person with this BAG who did not regularly drink would be "non-functional" and 
could not walk or talk. R. 298:8. A regular drinker would still be "significantly 
impaired" such that he would have great difficulty thinking, understanding, 
remembering, walking a straight line, or reasoning. R. 298:8. He believed a person 
with that level of intoxication could possibly pull a handgun trigger consciously, 
but that it would be questionable whether they could aim or operate it. R. 298: 18. 
McCallie 's mother, Carol Ibarra, testified that Pearce told her he "was very 
sorry for what happened" and said "it was an accident ... " R. 298: 77. Pearce said 
he wanted l\kCallie to give him "severance pay for the three days I was off work. " 
R. 298: 7 7. He also said he did not want to press charges. R. 298: 7 9. 
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:Marjorie l\!Iaughan, a friend of Ibarra's, also testified that she heard Pearce 
tell Ibarra that the shooting was an accident. R. 298:80-81 . 
H. THE EFFECTS OF A .31 BAC 
As Dr. Rothfeder testified, the effects of a .31 BAC are staggering for 
v,iitness comprehension. R. 298:6-18. They would have difficulty remembering or 
doing anything that would be necessary to accurately recollect something that 
happened, gwen their inability to reason, think, understand or remember. R. 
298 :8. 
"Alcohol impairs the ability to form new memories." 1 The "impact of 
alcohol on memory formation [i]s a dose-related continuum V\0.th mmor 
impairments at one end and very large impairments at the other, with all 
impairments representing the same fundamental deficit in the ability to store new 
information in memory for longer than a few seconds. "2 As doses increase beyond 
.15, "the resulting memory impairments can become much more profound, 
sometimes culminating in blackouts, a complete inability to remember critical 
elements of events, or even entire events, that transpired while intoxicated."3 
According to one text, a BAC of .30 results in a "stuporous state." The 
person would have the "inability to respond to stimuli" and would be "not likely to 
1 l\!lARC GALANTER ET AL., ALCOHOL PROBLEMS IN ADOLESCENTS AND YOUNG 





remember events the next day."4 A BAG not much higher, .35, would result in a 
person being completely anesthetized. Id. "Stupor and unconsciousness are present 
for many individuals who have BAG levels of .2 1 to .30. Marked central nervous 
system depression occurs at levels about .30, including decreased respiration and 
heart rate sometimes resulting in death." 5 As one text described the 
symptomology, a .31 is nearly fatal: 
Level 4: From .15 to .30 BAG, the person is in a high-risk state. All 
physical and mental functions are impaired considerably. The 
person is unable to walk without help. Breathing is labored, body 
temperature may go clown, and reflexes are depressed. There may 
be a loss of bladder control. Tlze person does not know what he or size is 
doing or saying and is unable to remember events. Loss of consciousness may 
occur. 
Level 5: Above a .30 BAC, a person is unconscious or in a coma. 
The part of the brain that controls breathing and heartbeat is 
dangerously affected. The person is close to death and could die 
without medical attention. 6 
Pearce admitted that he has consumed whiskey nearly ever day for thirty-
four years. R. 298:86-87. In fact, one of the most serious complications of long-
term alcohol use , according to all the research, is a significantly impaired 
memory. 7 Those who use alcohol frequently have "poorer spatial working 
4 RAYMO 1D GOLDBERG, DRUGS ACROSS THE SPECTRUM 126 (2013). 
5 GARY L. FISHER & A ·cy A. ROGET, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE 
PREVENTION, TREATMENT, AND RECOVERY 57- 58 (2008). 
6 VALERIE lVIENDRALLA & JANET GROSSHANDLER, DRINKING AI\JD DRIVING, 
Now WHAT? 18 (2011 ) (emphasis added). 
7 GOLDBERG, supra note 4, at 126; jOHNjUNG, ALCOHOL, OTHER DRUGS, A1"\JD 
BEHAVIOR: PSYCHOLOGICAL R ESEARCH PERSPECTIVES 203-04 (2009); lVIark S. 
Goldman et al., ALcolwlism and J\!Iem01y: Broadening the Scope of Alcohol-Expectancy 
Research, 110 PSYCHOL. BULL. 13 7 ( 1991 ); vVilliam vV. Beatty et al., Visuospatial 
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memory" and including an inability to form short-term memones or 
"remembering recent events and learning new information."8 Drinking over a long 
period "shrinks the brain," killing tissue which leads "to widespread deficits in 
cognition and behavior" including to deficits in working and long-term memory.9 
"Some people appear conscious and even function when they drink, but later, they 
have no memory of what transpired. This condition, referred to as an alcohol-
induced blackout, may be an early indication of alcoholism." 10 
I. PEARCE'S EXTREMELY HIGH BAC AFFECTED HIS ABILITY TO 
ACCURATELY PERCEIVE THE EVENTS 
vVhile Pearce testified confidently, the evidence reflects that he could not 
accurately perceive- if at all remember-the events given his high level of 
intoxication. Pearce could not remember what clothes McCallie wore. R. 297:35. 
Critically, he could not remember the exact date the shooting took place. He 
remembered finding out in the hospital that it was April Fool's Day, "not a good 
day to get shot," he said. R. 297:41-42. However, the shooting took place on the 
early morning hours of 1\/Iarch 31, a day earlier than Pearce's recollection. R. 
297:4-2. Therefore, it took Pearce almost 24 hours before he seemed to come out of 
the alcoholic stupor. 
Perception> Construction and Memory in Alcoholism, 5 7 J. STUD. ALCOHOL DRUGS 136 
( 1996). 
8 J UNG, supra note 7, at 203- 04. 
9 GREGORY FEIST ET AL., PSYCHOLOGY: MAKING Co NECTIONS 266 (2009). 
IO GOLDBERG, supra note 4, at 126- 27. 
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Pearce could not recollect any of the times and admitted he was only 
"guessing" about specifics. R. 297:50. He believed NicCallie arrived around 3 pm 
or sometime mid-afternoon. R. 297: 18-19, 23. However, Mc Callie provided 
documentation, both from his trucking company, as well as store receipts, that 
show he did not arrive until after 10 pm, seven hours later. R. 298:33-35, Def. Ex. 
14. According to Pearce, he had been drinking for 10 hours before the shot went 
off. R. 297 :33, 40. If Pearce arrived at 9 or 10 am, then the shot would have been 
around 7 or 8 pm. Notably, police did not receive the 911 call until 5: 17 am, nine 
hours after one of Pearce's recollections and five hours after the other. R. 297: 151. 
Pearce did not perceive the weapon . H e did not recall ever seeing a gun 
prior to the actual moment it was pointed at him. R. 297:49. He did not see Nlr. 
NicCallie reach down to get it. R. 297:42 . Nor did Pearce see McCallie go do his 
dresser or to the bed or pull the gun out of his waistband. R. 297:42. 
Pearce admitted on cross-examination that "everything [was] calm and 
everything [was] ok" before they walked into the bedroom, in contravention to his 
statements that the two were arguing. R. 297 :44. Indeed, he told police officers on 
April ·1st, just one day after the shooting, that NicCallie did not make any 
statements before pointing the gun at him, in contradiction to his trial testimony. 
R. 297:44-45. Pearce also told a detective that NicCallie said, "I'm going to kill 
your ass" and "I'm just going to kill you," different statements than his testimony. 
R.297:117. 
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Perhaps most importantly, Pearce told police day after the shooting that "it 
was all kind of a blur" and that "my memory isn't 100 percent on everything." R. 
297:47. He also said, "You know, I can't remember exactly." R. 297:48. Pearce 
testified that at the time he "was still-kinda things were still trying to sort thing 
out, everything that had happened." R. 297:45. 
Pearce admitted that he did not remember making some statements to the 
police nor could he remember all of their questions, claiming that a day later he 
was "still pretty shooken up ." R. 297:4-5-4-6. "I don't recall every question I was 
asked that day," he said. R. 297:49. He said things became clearer later because 
"once I had ... calmed down ... I was able to re-gather my thoughts and think 
about exactly what had happened ... "R. 297 :46. 
In reality, it wasn't that Pearce vvas under shock. According to the 
literature, he would have had no or little ability to form a memory at all. vVhat this 
reflects is that Pearce likely created these memories subsequently, when he was no 
longer so highly intoxicated. 
j. PEARCE'S STORY DOES NOT MATCH THE EVIDENCE 
Perhaps the most persuasive evidence of the inaccuracy of Pearce's memory 
1s its failure to comport with the evidence at the scene. According to Pearce, 
l\!IcCallie stood at the bed and that when he tried to push the gun down toward 
the ground, it fired, which would have been directed out of the room in a 
cl0vvnwarcl trajectory. Not only did police not find a bullet in that location or 
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direction (or anywhere else in the house for that matter), but the only possible 
location-a hole in the ceiling well inside the bedroom-was consistent with 
McCallie's version of events. While the police did not find a bullet, the detective 
admitted that the spot in the ceiling vvas the "most likely spot for that bullet hole" 
and that it was "very possible" that the bullet fell clown the wallboard. R. 297: 146-
47. Pearce's story, then, does not make sense. If the hole in the ceiling was made 
by the bullet, then it would have to travel downward through Pearce, turn around 
and go backwards into the room and up to the ceiling, a physical impossibility. 
Pearce's claim that lVIcCallie held the gun in his right hand was 
contradicted by Tim's statement that McCallie had the gun in his left hand. R. 
297 :60, 68-70, 80. It also contradicts McCallie's left-handedness. R. 297:60, 78. 
Additionally, Pearce's story fails to account, at its most basic level, for where 
the gun came from. Pearce could not recall where the gun came from-it just 
suddenly appeared. See point II H. supra. But McCallie wore sweatpants, as 
depicted in a police photograph. State's Ex. 6. It would be difficult for Mr. 
lVlcCallie to carry that firearm in tho~e pants without Pearce noticing it. Indeed, 
what makes more sense is McCallie's version that the gun was under the bed's 
pillow and was pulled out in a moment of struggle. 
K. INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
The State needed to show sufficient evidence that Mr. McCallie committed 
a 1) threat, 2) accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, 3) to do 
3 1 
bodily injury to another, 4,) with a dangerous weapon, 5) and not in self-defense. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-1 02 , 76-5-103. 
vVhile Pearce's testimony, if fully credited, amounts to sufficient evidence of 
an assault, his extreme intoxication reveals that no reasonable jury could believe 
his testimony and hence, the evidence was insufficient for that reason. T he State 
did not have any independent evidence of guilt other than the testimony of a 
person whom the literature states had a blood alcohol level that would almost 
entirely impair his memory. Pearce's statements to police soon after reflect his 
inability to remember what occurred and the evidence at the scene flatly 
contradicts his story. Thus, the evidence was insufficient to convict Mr. McCallie 
of aggravated assault. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, Mr. McCallie requests that this court reverse his 
aggravated assault conviction, given the prosecutor's comment on his invocation of 
his right to silence and the insufficiency of the evidence against him. 
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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
FIFTH AMENDMENT 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital , or othervvi se 
infamo us crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand 
J ury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the 
M ilitia, when in actual service in time of , 1Var or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same o ITense to be twice put in 
j eopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall priva te property be 
taken for public use, withoutjust compensation . 
SIXTH AMENDMENT 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed; which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his 
defen(s)e. 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, SECTION l 
All persons born or naturalized in the U nited State. and subj ect to 
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the 
State ,,.,,herein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or propen y, ,,vithou t due process of law; nor deny to any person 
vvithin its jurisdiction the equal pro tection o [ the laws. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
ARTICLE Jr, SECTION 7 . [DUE PROCESS OF LAW.] 
No per on shal l be deprived of li fe, liberty or property, without due 
process oflaw . 
.ARTICLE I, SECTION 12. [RIGHTS OF ACCUSED PERSONS.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right lo appear 
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and 
cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify 
in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to 
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his 
ovm behalf, to have a speedy pubJic trial by an impartial jury of the 
county or district in which the offense is alleg d to have been 
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases . 
Tab B 
ADDENDUMB 
Statutory and Rule Provisions 
76-5-102 . Assault. 
(1) Assaul t is : 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily mJury to 
another; 
(b) a Lhreal, accompanied by a show of immecliale force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily 
inj ury to another or creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or 
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the pregnancy. 
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily 
ir~ury to another. 
76-5-103. Aggravated assault. 
( l ) A person commits aggravated assault if the person commits assault as 
defined in Section 76-5-102 and u es : 
(a) a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; or 
(b) other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) (a) A violation of Subsection (I) is a third degree felony , except under 
Subsection (2)(b ). 
(b) A violation of Subsection (I) that results in serious bodily injury is a 
second degree felony. 
77-17-3. Discharge for insufficient evidence. 
\!\Then it appears lo the courl thal there is nol sufficient evidence to put a 
defendant to his defense, it shaJl fo rtbvvitl order him discharged. 
Utah R. Crim. P . 17 . The trial. 
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and defend in person 
and by counsel. T he defendant shall be personally present a t the trial with the 
fo llowing exceptions: 
( 1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions , defendant m ay consent in 
writing to trial in his absence; 
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death , the defendant's voluntary 
absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the time for trial shall not 
prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered therein shall 
have the same effect as if defendant had been present; and 
(3) T he court may exclude or excuse a defendant from trial for good cause shown 
which may include tumultuous, riotous, or obstreperous conduct. 
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may require the personal 
attendance of the defendant at the trial. 
(b) Cases shall be set on Lhe trial calendar to be tried in the following order: 
(I) misdem eanor cases when defendant is in custody; 
(2) felony cases ,,vhen defendant is in custody-
(3) felony cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance ; and 
(4-) misdem eanor cases when defendant is on bail or recognizance. 
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless Lhe defendant waives a jury in open 
court with the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution. 
(cl) All olher cases shall be tried vvithout a jury unless the defendant makes written 
demand at least ten days prior to trial, or the court orders othervvise . No jury shall 
be allowed in the trial of an infraction. 
(e) In all cases, the number of members of a trial jury shall be as specified in 
Section 78-46-5, U .C.A. 1953. 
(0 In all cases the pro ccution and defense may, wi th lbe consenl of lhe accused 
and th e approval of the court, by stipula tion in ,,vriting or made orally in open 
court, p roceed to trial or complete a trial then in progress ,vith any number of 
jurors 1 ss than othen,vise required . 
(g) After the jury has been impaneled and sworn, the trial shall proceed in the 
fo llm,ving order: 
( 1) The charge shall be read and the plea of the defendant stated; 
(2) T he prosecuting attorney may make an opening statement and the defense may 
make an opening statement or reserve it until the prosecution has rested; 
(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support of the charge; 
(4·) ,Nhen the prosecution has rested, the defense may present its case; 
(5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting evidence unless the court, for 
good cause, otherwise permits; 
(6) VVhen the evidence is concluded and at any other appropriate time, the court 
shall instruct the jury; and 
(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either side or on both sides vvithout 
argument, the prosecution shall open the argurn.ent, th e defense shall follow and 
the prosecution may close by responding to the defense argument. T he court may 
se t reasonable limits upon the argumen t of counsel for each party and the time to 
be allowed for argument. 
(h) If ajuror becomes ill , disabled or disqualified during trial and an alternate juror 
has been selected, the case shall proceed u ing the alternate juror. If no alternate 
has been selected, the parties may stipulate to proceed with the number of jurors 
remaining. Otherwise, the jury shall be di charged and a new trial ordered. 
(i) Questions by jurors . A judge may invite jurors to submit written questions to a 
witness as provided in this section. 
(1 ) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge shall control the 
process to ensure the jury maintains its role as the impartial fi nder of fact and does 
not become an investigative body. T he judge may disallow any qu estion from a 
juror and may disconti nue questions Crom jurors a l any time. 
(2) If the judge permits jurors to submit questions, the judge should advise the 
jurors that they may write the question as it occurs to them and submit the 
question to the bailiff for transmittal to the judge. T he judge should advise the 
jurors that some que ' lions might not be allowed. 
(3) The judge shall reviev,, the qu estion with counsel and unrepresented parties and 
rule upon any obj ection to the question. T he judge m ay disallow a question even 
though no objection is made . T he j udge shall preserve the ,,vri tten question in the 
court file. If the question is allowed, the judge shall ask the question or permit 
counsel or an unrepresented party to ask it. T he question may be rephrased into 
proper form. T he judge shall allow counsel and unrepresented parties to examine 
the ,vitness after the juror's question . 
U) \1\Then in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury to view the place in 
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, or in which any other 
material fact occurred, it m ay order them to be conducted in a body under the 
charge of an officer to the place, whi h shall be shown to them by some person 
appointed by the court for that purpose. T he officer shall be sv,,orn that v.rhile the 
jury are thu s conducted, he will suffer no person other than the person so 
appointed to speak to them nor to do so himself on any subj ect connected 'With the 
trial and to return them into court vvithout unnecessary delay or at a specified 
time. 
(k) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are permitted to separate or are 
sequestered, they shall be admonished by the co urt that it is their duty not lo 
converse among themselves or to converse wi th , or suffer themselves to be 
addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial , and that it is their duty 
not to form or express an op1mon thereon until the case 1. · finally submi tted to 
them. 
(1) Upon retiring for deliberation, the j ury may take vvith them the instructions of 
the court and all exhibits which have been received as evidence, except exhibits 
tha t should not, in the opinion of the court, be in the possession of the jury, such as 
exhibits of un usual size, weapons or contraband. The court shall permit the jury to 
view exhibits upon request. J urors are en titled Lo take notes during the trial and to 
have those notes with them during deliberations. As necessary, the ourt shall 
provide juro rs with writing materials and instruct the jury on taking and usmg 
notes. 
(m) vVhen the case is fi nally submitted to the jury, they shall be kept together in 
some convenient place under charge of an officer until they agree upon a verdict 
or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court. Except by order of the 
court, the officer having them under his charge shall not allow any communication 
to be made to them, or make any himself, except to ask them if they have agreed 
upon their verdict, and he shall not, before the verdict is rendered, communicate 
to any person the stale of their deliberations or the verdict agreed upon. 
(n) After the jury has retired for deliberation , if they desire to be informed on any 
point of law arising in th e cause, they shall inform th e officer in charge of them, 
,,vbo shall communicate such reques t to the court. T he court may th en direct that 
the jury be brought before the court where, in the pr sence oft.he defendant and 
both counsel, the ourl shall respond to th e inquiry or advise th e jury tha t no 
fur ther instructions shall be given . Such response shall be recorded. T he court may 
in its discre tion respond to the inquiry in vvriting vvithout having the jury brought 
before the court, in vvhich case the inquiry and t.hc respon e therelo shall be 
en tered in the record. 
(o) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorre Lon its face, it may be correc ted by 
the jury under the advice of th e court, or the jury may be sent out again. 
(p) At the conclusion or the evidence by tbe prosecution, or at the conclusion of all 
the evidence, the court may issue an order dismissing any information or 
indictment, or any count thereof upon Lh ground tha l the evidence is not legally 
sufficient to establish the offense charged the rein or any lesser included offense. 
Tab C 
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Motion for New Trial 
SCOTT A. WILSON, # 10486 
A11orneyjbr Defendc1111 
SALT LAKE LEG AL DEFEl\!DER AS SOCIATION 
424 East 500 Sout h, Sui te 300 
Salt Lake Ci ty, UT 84 11 l 
Telephone: (80 1) 532-5444 
fN THE THlRD OJSTRICT COU RT, STATE OF UTAH 
lN AND FO R SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
PURSUANT TO RULE 24 OF UTAH 
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Pla intiff, 
vs . 
Case No. 131903319 
JAMES CHRISTOPHER MCCALLJE 
Defend ant. JUDGE DENISE LINDBERG 
Comes the Defendant by counse l, Scott Wilson, and moves the Court to order a nevi trial for 
the fo llo\-vi ng reasons: 
1. The prosecutor commented on the Defendant's ri ght to remain silent when he was arrested 
for the offe nses in thi s info rmation. The Defendant refused to answer the questions of the 
po li ce when he was arrested. That refusa l was tantamount to invok ing hi s ri ght to remain 
si lent under the constitutions of Utah and the United States. In spite of the Defendant' s 
basic and obv ious righ t to remain sil en t, the prosecutor commented on hi s fai lure to provide 
the police with the reaso ns for the shooti ng. During the closing argument the prosecutor 
told the j ury that the Defendant had tri ed to get the alleged victim to say that the shooting 
was an accident. He vvenl on lo say that when the alleged victim refused to endorse that the 
shooting was an accident , that the Defendant then went to the self-protecti on defense. In 
order to bolster that con ten tion and sway the j ury into believ ing that lhe Defendan t was 
fabricating a defe nse, he stated that the Defendant did not tell the pol ice \vhen he \Vas 
arrested that he had acted in se lf-protection or that lhe shooting was an accident. Defense 
counsel immediately objec ted and moved for a mistrial. The objection and motion fo r a 
mis trial we -c den ied. The Defendant's righ t to a fa ir tri al was denied by the prosec utor's 
arg ument to the jury. The Defendant's right ro a fai r tr ial was fu rther prejud iced by the 
fa ilure of the Court to provide a corrective instruction to the jury. Therefore, the jury \Vas 
led to believe that the prosecutor's argument was legitimate and that they could rely upon it 
in making their decision. 
2. The Defendant was lound not guilty of the most serious charge of Discharge of a Firearm, a 
felony 2. He was found guilty of Aggravated Assault, a felony 3, after the jury deliberated 
for a considerable amount of time. The jury sent two questions to the Court. Although the 
Court correctly answered the questions, they showed that the jury was confused and in 
doubt about ,,vhat they were to consider in their deliberations. The prosecutor's argument 
to the jury that the Defendant's defenses were a fabr ication because he fai led to tell the 
police about them and the fai lure to correct that argument vio lated the Defendant's ri ght to 
a fair tri al. Those errors pushed the jury in the direc ti on of finding the Defendant gui lty of 
the aggravated assau lt. The prosecutor's case hinged on the jury believing the all eged 
victim over the testimony of the Defendant. They were the on ly witnesses to the shooting. 
The physical ev idence or where a bullet hole was found was inconsistent with the 
testimony of the al leged victim, but consi stent \•Vith the testimony of the Defendant. 
Therefore, the prosecutor had to impugn the Defendant and his testimony in order to 
convince the jury of guilt. He did that by stating that ii' his test imony and defenses were 
wor thy of belief that he would have told the police when he was arrested. The j ury was left 
with that be lief when there v,ias no correcrive instruction. The jury simply fo llov,1ed that 
argument to a verdict or guilty on one of the two offenses before them. 
RESPECTFU LLY submi tted this 30th day of December, 20 13. 
/S/ SCOTT A. WILSON 
SCOTT A. WILSON 
Artorney for Defendonr 
MAI LED/DELIVER!:]) a copy of the fo regoing Mot ion lo Clint Heiner at the office of the 
Distri ct Attorney, 111 East Broadway, Sui te 400, Salt Lake City , Utah, 8411 1 this 30th day or 
December, 20 13. 
Tab E 
ADDENDUME 
State's Response to Motion for New Trial 
SIM GILL 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
CLINT HEINER, Bar No. 11905 
Deputy District Attorney 
11 1 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone : (801) 363-7900 
· ~·cu .~: 1 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-







STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL PURSUANT 
TO RULE 24 OF UTAH RULES OF 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Case No. 131903319 
Hon. DENISE LINDBERG 
Clint Heiner, Deputy District Attorney, and Attorney for the State, hereby requests that 
Defendant's Motion For New Trial be denied. 
DATED this _ _ day of ___ ~ , 2013. 
SIM GILL 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
By: 
I- Facts 
During the State's closing argument, the State argued that Defendant' s theory 
about what had occurred on the night in question had changed and Defendant's 
testimony at trial was not credible. At trial, Defendant testified that shotting John 
(Victim) was in self-defense. To point out to the jury that Defendant's claim of self-
defense was not credible the State pointed out that Defendant's story changed 
multiple times. 
The State argued, in one jail call Defendant did not even know who he shot and 
did not remember anything. In another jail call Defendant told his mother to 
convince John to state that this was an accident. Then after Defendant was not 
successful in getting John to say it was an accident, Defendant decided to claim self-
defense because John was "not playing ball." Finally, the state argued that Defendant 
was given an opportunity to tell the police what had occurred on the night in question 
and instead of saying it was an accident or that it was in self-defense, as he claimed at 
trial, Defendant was confused why police were even there and told them "nothing 
happened" (Defendant did not invoke his right to remain silent at this point). When 
the state made this argument Defendant objected, requested a mistrial, and at a 
minimum that a corrective instruction be given to the jury. All three requests were 
denied. Defendant was convicted of Aggravated Assault. 
Defendant now requests a new trial. In his motion, Defendant argues that the 
State's statement in closing argument was a comment about Defendant's right to 
remain silent which was improper and denied Defendant a fair trial. Defendant also 
contends that the Court should have provided a corrective instruction to the jury to 
advise the jury that the State's argument was improper. 
H· Law 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 24, Motion for new trial states: 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant 
a new trial in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety 
which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party 
( emphasis added). 
If a constitutional error is substantial and prejudicial to the extent that there is a 
reasonable probability that it affected the reliability of the trial outcome, then a new 
trial is required. State v. Maas, 991 P.2d 1108 (Utah App.,1999). The Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits use of a defendant's post- Miranda 
silence for impeachment purposes. State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801 (Utah.App.,1998). 
III- Argument 
Here, the State agrees that Defendant has a right to remain silent; however, he 
didn't. Defendant made a statement to the police that "nothing happened" and then 
he made different statement~_ to different people, (i.e. he did remember anything and it 
was an accident), and then at trial made a totally different statement (i.e. that it was 
self-defense). This is proper argument and was properly argued to show that 
Defendant is not credible and his claim of self-defense should not be believed. 
Because the argument was proper, no corrective instruction was required. 
llV. Conclusion 
Because the State's argument was proper no corrective instruction was required; 
therefore, Defendant's motion for new trial should be denied. 





Ruling and Order on Motion for New Trial 
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRJCT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff( s ), 
vs. 
JAMES CHRISTOPHER MCCALLIE, 
Defendant( s ), 
MINUTE ENTRY RULING & 
ORDER 
CASE NO. 1319033 19 
Judge Denise P. Lindberg 
Date: 10th February 2014 
Motion for new trial is DENIED. The Court first notes that the transcript provided by 
defense counsel is only a partial transcript of the State's rebuttal argument. As such, it's difficult 
to evaluate the full context of the claimed wrongdoing by the prosecutor. But, even with this limited 
record, the Court concludes that the prosecutor's comment on rebuttal was an appropriate comment 
on the credibility of defendant's testimony, given the inconsistencies in defendant's prior statements 
to the police and others. 
The Court disagrees with defense counsel's argument that defendant's alleged "refusal" to 
answer questions was "tantamount to invoking his right to remain silent." The right to remain silent 
must be invoked unequivocally. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010). The evidence 
in this case was that defendant was not cooperative, but did make statements to the police on the date 
of the incident. 
So ORDERED this 10th day of February, 2013 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify tha t a copy of the attached document was sent to t h e 
following p eople for case 131903319 by the me t h od and on t h e date 
specif ied . 
MAIL : J AMES CHRISTOPHER MCCALLIE 1938 NUNLEY CIRCLE HOLL~.DAY, UT 
84121 
MAIL : CLINT T HEINER 111 E BROADWAY STE 4 00 SALT LAKE CITY UT 
84111 
MAIL: SCOTT A WILSON 424 E 500 s STE 300 SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
02/ 11 /2014 /s/ AMY BAUGHMAN 
Date : 
Deputy Court Cl erk 
















TABLE 6 .1 Approximate Blood Alcohol 
Concen l r'Ol ions 
"' Body Weigtit (pounds) ·· 
Drinks 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 
(per hour) , 
.04 .03 .03 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02 
2 .08 .06 .05 .05 .04 .04 .03 .03 
3 .11 .09 .08 .07 .06 .06 .05 .05 
4 .15 .12 .11 .09 .08 .08 .07 .06 
5 .19 .16 .13 .12 .11 .09 . 09 .08 
6 .23 .19 .16 .14 .13 .11 .1 0 .09 
7 .26 .22 .19 .16 .15 .1 3 . 12 .11 
8 .30 .25 .2 1 .1 9 .17 .15 .14 .13 
9 .34 .28 .24 .21 .19 .17 .1 5 .14 
10 .38 .3 .27 .23 .21 .19 .17 .1 6 
Sou,ce Disti lled Sp1rr ls Council oi the United Slates. 
TABLE 6 .2 Effec ts ot Alcohol o1 Varying Blood 
Alcohol Concentrations 
~ 1''eAc ·· · · ..... , ., .. " ...... · · ........ efh!c.is' - · 











Less alert; less inhibited ; s lightly irnpaited 
judgme l ; slight euphoria 
Slower reaction time; impaired muscle 
control: reduced visual and auditory acui ly: 
legal intoxication in most states 
Distorted perception and judgment; 
impaired mental and physical functions; 
less responsible behavior 
Markedly affected psychomotor ability; 
difficul ty staying awake 
Inability o stand without help; grossly 
attecte d ab ili ty to comprehend 
Stu porous state; inability to respond lo 
stimuli; 1 ot likely to remember events the 
nex day 
Complete ly anesthetized; 1 % will die at this 
SAC 
State o f unconsc iousness or coma: half will 
fatally overdose without medical intervention 
Deep coma or complete unconsciousness 
if not already dead 
Effects of Alcohol 
A lcohol accounts for 10% of all deaths in the United 
States each yea r, a nd the life expectancy of an alco-
ho li c is reduced by 15 yea rs. lt affects every orga n in 
the body. Two important factors that determine h ow 
126 Chapter 6 Alcohol 
alcoh ol affects the bod y are frequency o f use a:1d 
gu anrity consumed . The type of alcohol consumed 
does not ma tte r. In a study of m al e an d female 
adolescents, beer, wine , and distilled spir it s p r o -
duced equa lly damag ing physica l impairme nt.8 3 l n 
th is section, we will exa mine the acme and chronic 
effects of alcohol on the bra in , li ver, gas troi n tes tinal 
trac1, card iovascular system, and immune system, 
as we ll as th e rela tio nship t etween a lcoh o l and 
ca ncer F igu re 6.3 illu str ates the effects of a lcohol 
on various body systems . 
The definition of modera te d n nking for me1 is 
110 m ore than two alcoho li c dri nks per day, and for 
wo men, it is no more thai. one alcoholic dr ink per day . 
Light drinking would be less tha n th is amou nr. T he r e 
is no standard defin iti on ofheaYy d r inking_, although a 
commonly accepted number fo r bi:1ge d rin king is con-
su mptio n of five or more drinks a t one sitting !or men 
and four o r more drinks for women at one sitting . 
Alcohol and the Brain 
The brain is highly sensiti ve to the effects of alcohol. 
F ive 10 s ix d ri n ks dai ly w ill adversely effec t cogn i-
t iv(' functi ning. T he extent o f impairment increases 
with high er levels of consump tion . An esti m ated 15% 
to 30% o f all nursing home pati ents a re ad rni tte I be-
cause of permanent alcoh ol-induced bra in rla mage. 8·1 
Alcoho l ac ts o n the cerebrum, affec tin g judg m en t, 
reason in g, and inhibitions. It sti mulates the release of 
sero on in, whi ch could accoum for the d isinh ibiti ng 
effect of alcoh ol. 
Alcohol acting o n the cerebral cortex affects mo-
to r activi ty, a nd moods change quickJy. Alcohol stim-
ul ates the relea se of d opamine, accou nting for fe elings 
of pleasu re or euphor ia. T he senses a r e impai red 
whe n alcoh ol affects the cerebe llum . Many alcohol -
ics experience memory loss and difficu lty wirh prob-
lem-solving and clecision -m aking. 85 At some level of 
consumpti on of alcohol, the medu ll a is sedated to tile 
p in t that respiration c ou ld stop. J\ report released 
fr m the National Institute on Drug Abuse states that 
autopsy s1ud ies show ch ro me alcohol use sh rin ks rhe 
brain especially in women. 86 
Although drin~-jng sm all amounts of alcoho l da il y 
d oes no t affect memo ry adverse ly, occasio na l large 
amounts cou ld harm memory . A study of teenagers 
in the U nite d K ingdom fou nd that th ose who used 
c:--.:c1::ssivc amoun ts of a lcohol suffered fro m m emo ry 
prob lems.87 Simila rl y, U.S. mi ddle-schoo l students 
experienced memory loss afte r d . in king.88 
Alcohol-ind u ced amnes ia usually las ts a short 
time . Some people ap pea r conscious an d even fu nc-
tio n when th ey d rin k, but later, they ha e no memory 
of what transpired . This con ditio n, r eferr ed to as an 
a lcohol-induced b lackout, m ay be an ea rl y indication 
Brain and central nervous system 
• Damages and eventual!} destroys 
brain cells 
• Impairs memory 
• Dulls senses 
• I rnpai rs physical coordi nati "'l 
Ai,ects Judgrne.nl, reasoning, 
and 1nn1bitions 
Immune syslem 
• owers res istance 
to disease 
• Damages and eveniually 
de troys liver cells 
• Caus«s medical con itions 
including fatty liver, 
alcohol hepatitis. 
and cir rhosis 
Gastrointestinal tract 
• Causes inilammation 
• May cause cancer 
• Lead s to pancreatitis 
Hearl 
• lv1ay rai,e blood pressure 
• Causes irreg ular heartbeat 
• Causes conditions including 
card iomyopathy, AHMD. ischemrc heart 
disease. and cerebrovascular 
disorders (e g .. stroke) 
Stomach and Intestines 
• Causes bleed'ng and inflamrnat1on 








Reproductive system ~ ~ 
{female shown) s: :g 
• In women , menstrual cycles become irregular: 3: '; 
pregnant women have an increased risk of bearing i j 
children with bi rth defects § 0 
• In men. hormone levels may be al tered: 




Figure 6 .3 Effects of Alcohol Use on Body Systems Over Time 
of alcoholism. Ginally, prenatal exposu re of the fe tus 
to alcoho l possibly affec ts its attention an d memory 
for th e long te rm even with no more drnn o ne drink 
per day.89 
One condition resu lting from chro ni c alcohol 
abuse is \'v'ernicke-Korsakoff syndrom e, which occurs 
in about 20% of chronic alcoh ol users. Th is synd rome 
develops because alcohol impedes the body's abil ity 
to ut ilize th iamine, one of the B vitamins. \\> The pe r-
so n with th is diso rder is able to remember events or 
facts learned early in life but unable to recal l recent 
events o r facts. Other charac teristics of th is disease 
are disorientation, nerve damage, poor coordinat ion, 
and rapid horizonta l eye movement. 
Chronic alcohol use is associated with neurotic 
an d psychotic sy 111p to111s ranging fro m depressive 
reactions to general ized anxiety disorders and panic 
attacks. One study reported diat about 20% of p ople 
diagnosed wid1 a mood or anxiety disorde r were al-
cohol ic."1 Du tch you ths aged 12 to 18 wh o engaged 
in binge drin king experienced higher rates of mental 
health pro blems.92 
Among college students, those who have higher 
leve ls of social an. ·i ety are more likely to co nsume 
alcoh ol. 9 ' Adolescents wid1 m ood d isorders who 
self- med ica te with alcohol and other drugs are m ore 
likely to exacerba te the ir prob lems and may be at 
great r risk fo r suicide. 9• Clinical depression is com -
mon. Depressed adolescents arc more likely to drink 
a lcoho l and use other drugs t han n onde pres sed 
adolescents. 95 It is unclear if alcohol abuse leads to 
depression or if depression leads to alcohol abuse. 
Nonetheless, one-third to one -hal f of alcoholics 
exhib it symptoms of depression at some time. Treating 
dep ression could help prevent relapse in recovering 
alcoholics . 
Alcohol and the Liver 
C hronic alcohol consumption increases the risk for 
cancer in 111any orga n s, includin g the liver.96 Because 
the liv er is the m ain si te of metabol is m of alcohol, 
heav y alcohol use can have devastating effe cts on 
that organ. T h e thre e mai n conditions assoc iated 
with overuse of alcohol are fatty liver, alcohol hepa-
titis, and ci rrh osis. If one al r eady h as hepatitis C, then 
alc oh ol will e:,acerbate the condition, r esul ting in a 
shorter lifespan . T he mean age of death for wo men 
with h epa titis C who drink heavily is reduced from 
61. 0 years to 49 .1 years. T he comparable reduction 
fo r males is 55. J yea rs to 50.0 years .97 Cirrhosis is 
irre versible, even if alcoho l use stops. Some signs of 
fatty li ver are evident in 90% to 100% of heavy drink-
ers, whereas 10% co 35% develop alcohol h epatitis, 
and 1 0% to 20% deve lo p cirrhosis. 98 Fatty li ver can 
de velo p \ ,i d1in a few days of heavy drinki ng . Sy111p-
toms of alcoh o l hepatitis inc lude jau n dice (a yel-
lowish skin co lor), fatigue, low-g rade feve r, reduced 
appeti te, da rk urine , and occasiona l vomiting and 
nausea . 
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• 
Chapte r Nine 
intoxicatioA 
A transient state of physical 
and psychological 
disruption caused by the 
presence of a toxic 
substance, such as alcohol, 
in the CNS. 
REM sleep 
Acronym for ··rapid eye 
movements," which are 
associated with dream 
activity and are one stage in 
a cycle of sleep 
hladcout 
Fai lure to recall events that 
occurred while d rinking 
even though there is no loss 
of consciousness 
short--tl!nn memori, 
Memory for recent events: 
thought to d iffer from long-
term memory ,n several 
important ways 
long-term memori, 
Memory for remote events. 
According to o ne theory of 
memory, information enters 
long-te rm memo ry thro ugh 
short-term memory 
One point about alcohol's acute effects is th at alcohol generally acts on the body as 
a depressant, and its acu te effects are proportional to the magnitnde o f the BAC. Sim-
ply put, as the BA.C incre,1ses, acute effects incre.1se in number ,111d intensity. HO\\-e\·er, 
how humans experience some degree o f intoxication ;.111d bc:!1a\·c 1111der different 
doses of alcohol 111,1y be modified by psychological and situational facto rs JS well ,1s 
,1lcoho l dose ,111d toler,1nce to this drug. Fo r so me be ha\'iors, these nondrng factors 
may be C\'Cll more pom:rful de tennin;.1ms o f alco hol 's acute effects than drug factors. 
Physiological Effects 
,-\!coho! t,1ken ,1t low doses has se\'eral physiologic:d effects. 1 Alcohol inhibits the secre -
tion of the an tidiuretic hormone, which Gn1ses increased urination. The effect happens 
when the R:\C is rising but not when it is falling . .-\!coho! ;1lso reduces the amount of 
body fat that is oxidized . This .,cute effect of ,1lcohol .1ecumubtes to result in lo11g-
rcr111 increased body fat and weigh t gain when ;.1lco hol is used in ;.1ddition to normal 
food intake (Suter, Scl111tz, & Jequier, 1992). Such weight gain is commonly called ,1 
" beer belly." Alcohol is ,1 peripher,1! d ilator ,1nd c.rnses the skin to feel warm ;1nd turn 
red. 1\ n nmbcrofauthors ha\'C C;.,Htioned ag;.1inst nsing ;.1lcoholic bc\'cragcs to \\·arm up 
in cold en\·ironments. This Jd\'ice is CO\lnterintuitive tO many d rinkers, who experience 
the warmth th,1t occurs \\·ith peripher,1! dibtion and know of the S.1int Rern.1rd and its 
keg of brandy rescuing \"ictim s in sno\1·-con.:red mountains. Alcohol's dilating effect 011 
peripheral blood \·essels c.rnses some loss of body heat, howe\·er, and such action was 
thought to ultim,1tely decrease protection ,1ga i11 st the cold. I t turns 0llt the problem is 
not a serious one, :.is experimental studies ha\·e shown that alcohol docs not signifi -
cantly t ilt the babnce o f the body's temperarnre regulation in cold e1wironments. 
An ,1cute .1lcohol effect with wide pr.1ctical applic:ition is th:it it increJses gast ric se-
cretion, which is one basis for the U .S. cockt,1il hour. The increase in gastric secretion 
stimulates the appetite. U nfortunately, ,1lcohol at high doses harms the stomach mu-
cos,1 .1nd causes gastric distress. Nause.1 .1nd \'Omiti ng nu y occ11r :it Ri\Cs greater than 
0.1 5%. Anothe r physiological effect of alcohol when taken in high doses and when the 
B.'\C increases rapidly is a rele,1se of corticosteroids , part of the body's general re.,ction 
to stress. In this case, the stressor is a high dose of ,1lcohol, which is toxic to the body. 
An import.mt ;.1cutc effect of alcohol is disruption of sleep patterns. Even ;.1 t lo\\"er 
doses , alcohol suppresses REM sleep, which is the stage of the sleep cycle when most 
dre,1ming occnrs (REM stands for " r..ipid eye 1110 \'ements," \\"hich char.1cterize this 
stage of sleep). When the dose is IO\\· , RE.\1 sleep is snpprcsscd only in t he first half of 
the night, but REM time reboHnds and incre.1ses in the second half. .-\t larger doses of 
.1 lcoho!, REM sleep is suppressed throughout the night. 
Alcohol imp:.lirs memory. Its acure effects a rc on short-term memory, and when 
high RACs are reached rapidly, a blacko ut may occur. Blacko uts are an indi\'idual's 
,rn, nesia abom evenrs when drinking, e\'e n tho ugh there \\"JS 110 loss of consciousness . 
for example , :.i person \\"ho had :i lot ro d rin k rhc night before may \\"ake up ;.1nd ha\·e 
absolutely no reco llection o f where he or she parked the c.1r. Bl:ickouts are thought to 
result from ,1 fai lure in the tr,111sfer o f in formation in short-term m emory to long-
term memory. Animal stndies snggcst th;.,t the mechanism for this effect is alcohol ' s 
interference with receptors in the brai n that enhance connec tions among neurons and 
:ire fnndament:il to le,1rning,1 nd memo ry (Tokuda, Izumi , & Zorumski, 2011). People 
also h;.1\·c "grayouts," in \\"hich they c;.111 partially recall e\'ents that occurred in fu ll 
'Much of the d iscussion of alcohol's acute effects is based on Becker et al. (1975), Jacobs and Fehr (1987), 
McKim (2000), and Sobell and Sobel I (1981). 
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164 II O Neurobiology 
almost infinite diversity of symptoms that may ensue from the action of this sin-
gle toxic agent." ln addition to impairing balance, motor coordination, decision 
making, and a long list of other functions, alcohol impairs the ability to form 
new memories. Alcohol primarily disrupts the ability to form memories that are 
explicit in nature, including memories for focts (e.g., names, phone numbers, 
etc.) and events (e.g., what you did last night) (Lister et al., 1991). lhe impact of 
alcohol on the formation of new long-term explicit memories is far greater than 
the drug's impact on the ability to recall previously established memories or to 
hold ne\v information jn memory for a fe\v seconds. When intoxicated subjects 
are asked to repeat new information immediately after its presentation or fol-
lowjng short delays (e.g., a fev,1 seconds), they often do fine (see Ryback, 1971, 
for an early revie·w). Similarly, subjects typically do quite well at retrieving 
information acquired prior to acute intoxication. In contrast, intoxicated sub-
jects have great difficulty storjng new information across delays lasting rn.ore 
than a few seconds, particularly if they are distracted bet,veen the stimulus 
presentation and testing. For instance, Acheson et al (1998) observed that intoxi-
cated subjects coi1ld recall items on words lists jmmediately after the lists \Vere 
presented, but had great difficulty recalling the i terns 20 n,jnutes later. 
Ryback characterized the impact of alcohol on memory formation as a 
dose.related continuum with mi.nor impairments at one end and very large 
impairments at the other, with all impairments representing the same funda-
mental deficit in the ability store new information in memory for longer than a 
few seconds. Consistent with this view, research indicates that the magnitude 
of alcohol-induced memory impairments increases with dose but the same 
general pattern, greater difficulty forming new memories than recalling exist-
ing memories, remajns. When doses of alcohol are small to moderate,, such as 
those producing blood alcohol concentrations below 0.15%, memory impair-
ments tend to be small to moderate, as \vell. At these levels, alcohol produces 
what Ryback (1971) referred to as cocktail party memory deficits, lapses .in 
memory that one might experience after having a few drinks at a cocktail party, 
often manifested as "problems reme.mberjng what the other person said or 
where they were in conversation." Several studies have revealed dHficulty 
forming memories for items on word lists or learnir1g to recognize new faces at 
these doses. As the doses jncrease, the res1.1ltjng memory impairments can. 
become much more profound, sometimes culminating in blackouts, a complete 
inability to remember critical elements of events, or even entire events, that 
transpired \Vhile intoxicated (White et al., 2002a). 
4. Mechanisms Underlying Alcohol-Induced Memory Impairments 
Until recently, a lack of knm-vledge regarding the neuropharmacological 
effects of alcohol hampered progress toward ru1 understanding of the mecha-
nisms imderlying alcohol-induced memory impairments. Alcohol was long 




self-confident, his or her reaction time, judgment, 
senses, and movement are impaired. 
• Level 3: When the blood alcohol content reaches .08 
to .1 5 percent, the person is in a risky state. Thoughts 
can become muddled, and speech can become slurred. 
Vision and hearing are affected as well. Balance, 
coordination, and muscle control are impaired, 
sometimes resulting in a staggered walk. The indi -
vidual may have nausea or vomiting. At or above .08 
BAC, a person is considered lega lly intoxicated . 
Driving with a BAC of .08 or greater is illegal for 
adults older than twenty-one in the United States. It 
is unlawful fo r drivers under twenty-one to have any 
amount of alcohol in their blood. 
• Level 4: From . ·1 5 to .3 0 BAC, the person is in a high-
risk sta te. All physical and mental functions are 
impaired considerably. The person is unable to walk 
without help. Breathing is labored, body temperature 
may go down, and reflexes are depressed. There may 
he a loss of bladder control. The person does not 
know what he or she is doing or saying and is unab le 
to remember events. Loss of consciousness may occur. 
• Level 5: Above a .30 BAC, a person is unconscious or 
in a coma. The part of the brain that controls breath-
ing and heartbeat is dangerously affected . The person 
is close to death and could die wi thout medica l 
attention. 
